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Nuclear energyThis study examines the justice and equity implications of four low-carbon transitions, and it reveals the
‘‘lived experiences” of decarbonisation as manifested across Africa and Europe. Based on extensive, orig-
inal mixed methods empirical research – including expert interviews, focus groups, internet forums,
community interviews, and extended site visits and naturalistic observation – it asks: How are four speci-
fic decarbonisation pathways linked to negative impacts within specific communities? Relatedly, what
vulnerabilities do these transitions exacerbate in these communities? Lastly, how can such vulnerabilities
be better addressed with policy? The paper documents a troublesome cohabitation between French
wineries and nuclear power, the negative effects on labor groups and workers in Eastern Germany by
a transition to solar energy, the stark embodied externalities in electronic waste (e-waste) flows from
smart meters accumulating in Ghana, and the precarious exploitation of children involved in cobalt min-
ing for electric vehicle batteries in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The aims and objectives of the
study are threefold: (1) to showcase how four very different vulnerable communities have been affected
by the negative impacts of decarbonisation; (2) to reveal tensions and tradeoffs between European tran-
sitions and local and global justice concerns; and (3) to inform energy and climate policy. In identifying
these objectives, our goal is not to stop or slow down all low-carbon transitions. Rather, the study sug-
gests that the research and policy communities ought to account for, and seek to minimize, a broader
range of social and environmental sustainability risks. Sustainability transitions and decarbonisation
pathways must become more egalitarian, fair, and just.
 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
The Paris climate accords aim to keep global temperature rise
well below 2 C,[1 aspiring to stay below 1.5 C above preindustrial
levels on a path of ‘‘deep decarbonization” (Rockström, 2017;
Moberg et al., 2019; Geels, et al., 2017). Reaching either one of
these goals requires a rapid transition towards low-carbon energy
and mobility systems by 2050 ([IPCC] Intergovernmental Panel on,
2019; Hansen, et al., 2017).
Western Europe-inclusive of the European Union (EU) but also
countries such as Norway-has long been viewed as a forerunner
in implementing progressive energy and climate policies, andaccelerating emissions reductions necessary to reach a 1.5 C tar-
get. As the European Commission described itself when justifying
a vision for a climate neutral economy in 2018, ‘‘the EU has been
at the forefront of addressing the root causes of climate change
and strengthening a concerted global response in the framework
of the Paris Agreement” (European Commission & Planet, 2018).
For instance, the EU has already reduced its collective greenhouse
gas emissions by 22% from 1990 levels, and is on track to reduce
them by 26% below 1990 levels by 2020 (European Environment
Agency, 2018). This is no small feat, considering that the EU-28
is responsible for 11.9% of total final energy consumption world-
wide, coming after only China and the United States, and it is also
responsible for 10.4% of global carbon dioxide emissions
(Commission, 2019). Future projections and formal planning docu-
ments at the national and regional scale are aiming for a ‘‘zero-
carbon” Nordic energy system (International Energy Agency and
Nordic Energy Research., 2016), a ‘‘net zero” United Kingdom
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to decarbonize Germany (German Federal Ministry for the
Environment, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear Safety, 2016).
However, the political responses to climate change can become
embroiled in economic displacement, unemployment, embodied
externalities, and human rights abuses. The path towards decar-
bonization can bring social net benefits, but it can also enhance
vulnerabilities. As Carley et al. write, ‘‘Some individuals and com-
munities are more vulnerable to possible adverse impacts than
others” (Carley et al., 2018). This makes it difficult for both policy-
makers and consumers to connect the abstract, complex, and non-
linear processes of climate change with efforts aimed at addressing
vulnerability or equitably distributing the co-benefits of climate
action (Markowitz & Shariff, 2012; Alberini et al., 2018; Balbus
et al., November, 2014; Burke, 2018; Noel et al., 2018; Ürge-
Vorsatz, 2014; Sovacool et al., 2020; Sovacool & Dworkin, 2014).
In this study, based on an extensive original qualitative dataset
utilizing mixed methods across multiple countries, we ask: How
are four specific European decarbonization pathways – nuclear
power in France, solar energy in Germany, smart meters in Great
Britain, and electric vehicles in Norway – linked to negative
impacts within specific communities? Relatedly, what vulnerabili-
ties can low-carbon transitions exacerbate in these communities?
Lastly, what policy reforms need to be implemented?
Our analysis is centered on four qualitative case studies. These
cases emerged from our first phase of research when we conducted
interviews and focus groups in France, Germany, Norway, and the
United Kingdom (UK). This led us to a second phase of extended
field research in Southern France, Eastern Germany, central Ghana,
and Southwestern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Based
on these data, the paper documents and humanizes the trouble-
some cohabitation between French wineries and nuclear power,
the negative effects from solar energy on labor groups and workers
in Eastern Germany, the stark embodied externalities in electronic
waste (e-waste) flows from smart meters accumulating in Ghana,
and the precarious exploitation of children involved in cobalt min-
ing for electric vehicle (EV) batteries in the DRC.
The aims and objectives of the study are threefold: to showcase
how four very different vulnerable communities have been
affected by the negative impacts of decarbonization; to reveal ten-
sions and tradeoffs between European low-carbon transitions and
local and global justice concerns; and to inform energy and climate
policy. In identifying these objectives, our goal is not to stop or
slow down all low-carbon transitions. Rather, the study suggests
that the research and policy communities ought to account for,
and seek to minimize, a broader range of social and environmental
sustainability risks. Through a rich, mixed methods study, we make
a contribution to the literatures on dispossession; political ecology,
economy and geography of energy transitions; and the whole sys-
tem and justice implications from energy transitions. Our study
shows that decarbonization pathways must become more egalitar-
ian, fair, and just, empowering communities and challenging,
rather than strengthening, the power of energy, mining and waste
corporations. Furthermore, the study is not only descriptive or
diagnostic, it is also normative or prescriptive. It presents rich,
original mixed methods data from our four cases, drawn from 48
expert interviews, on policy solutions. The article therefore moves
beyond only identifying problems to more actionable recommen-
dations planners and other stakeholders can leverage to combat
injustice. This helps push the policymaking community towards
more ‘‘justice aware” incentives and policy mixes, a critical ‘‘new
frontier” for this type of research (Sovacool et al., 2017).
Our paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 discusses our con-
ceptual approach and howwe build on previous literature. We out-
line details of our cases and empirical data collection in Section 3.
Results are presented in Sections 4–7, which we then discussfurther in Section 8. Section 9 concludes with also recommenda-
tions for policy.2. Conceptual connections: Dispossession, sacrifice zones, and
whole-systems justice in low-carbon transitions
As an overarching conceptual framework to help guide our
interpretation of results and connect it to ongoing debates, we
engage with the notions of dispossession, political ecology, sacri-
fice zones, and energy justice.
First, to the literature on dispossession, we broaden and empiri-
cally confirm its presence across comparative cases (varying geo-
graphic context) as well as different low-carbon systems (varying
technological specificity). Political dispossession has been defined
as the (neoliberal) restructuring of the state by finance through
the privatization of profits, and the socialization of losses
(Keucheyan, 2018). Bernstein has also developed a typology of
physical dispossession, or land-grabbing, that emphasizes pres-
sures coming from political elites in urban areas or even transna-
tional flows of capital (Bernstein, 2010). Dispossession can be
associated with the processes that market elites utilize to effec-
tively possess the assets of others (Sovacool et al., 2019). Our cases
show how dispossession can also arise from economic factors
(such as differences in wealth and income between elites and com-
munity actors) or environmental factors (such as toxic pollution).
We return to these in the conclusion.
Second, to work emerging on the political ecology, political econ-
omy and geography of energy transitions, we reveal a host of injus-
tices – a broader lexicon of vulnerability or exclusion—extending
beyond where most literature focuses, which is land use, financing,
or jobs and employment. Analyzing the political ecology and econ-
omy of decarbonization – its uneven power relations, conflicts, vio-
lence, elite interests and vulnerabilities – is crucial to more
comprehensively understanding energy justice (Newell &
Mulvaney, 2013; Swilling & Annecke, 2012). This illustrates the
ways ‘‘in which uneven exposure to environmental benefits and
harm is often not accidental and unintentional, but rather a pro-
duct of a particular way of organizing production and its constitu-
tive social relations” (Newekk & Mulvane 0000). Already in 2012,
Zehner pointed to the range of ecological, social and economic
costs of renewable energy systems and the prevalent focus on
technological solutions at the cost of political and social change –
productivism over reductionism (Zehner, 2012). Decarbonization
strategies that do not challenge relations of power and socio-
cultural systems, political ecologists have illustrated, may simply
displace ecological destruction and extractivism for industrial
development and profits to more vulnerable communities.
The communities – often of color, indigenous peoples and poor
people – who live in such ecological sacrifice zones are character-
ized by the way they are ‘‘required to make disproportionate
health and economic sacrifices that more affluent people can
avoid” (Lerner, 2010). These local and global inequalities have been
linked to environmental racism (Bullard, 1993), the disproportion-
ate effects on community of color both in the global North and the
global South. Sacrifice zones not only denote infamous sites of fos-
sil fuel destruction, such as sites of Mountaintop Removal in the
United States (Fox, 1999), but have become part of the green econ-
omy and its decarbonization efforts (Scott & Smith, 2017). Scott
and Smith have shown how solar energy systems might clash with
arable land and food justice concerns (Scott & Smith, 2017), and
Hernández illustrates how ‘‘energy sacrifice zones” link vulnerable
communities along the lifecycle of renewable energy technologies
(Hernández, 2015).
The final area of intellectual engagement relates to energy jus-
tice. Building on earlier critiques of the injustices associated with
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illustrated the processes of exclusion, inequality, marginalization
or even the repression and criminalization of resistance against
decarbonization strategies in the broad domain of energy and cli-
mate policy. These include the procedural injustices, the unequal
social and ecological impacts and uneven benefits of wind farm
permitting and siting (Dunlap, 2018a, 2017, 2018b), or the exclu-
sionary nature of land decision-making for biofuel (German et al.,
2011; Borras et al., 2010) or tree plantations (Baka, 2017), and even
large-scale solar energy (Yenneti et al., 2016). Others discuss elit-
ism or unfairness in energy and climate financing (Sovacool
et al., 2019) or policy and program design (Baker et al., 0000;
Baker, 2015). A related stream of work emphasizes ‘‘just transi-
tions” and the actors or institutions that have the most to lose
(in terms of jobs, assets, or credibility) as societies around the
world decarbonize (Newell & Mulvaney, 2013). In addition to
socially ‘‘just”, however, this paper also points to the need for
decarbonization to be ‘‘environmentally just” (Newell &
Mulvaney, 2013), i.e. not exacerbating or reproducing environmen-
tal inequalities, such as exposure to pollution, land degradation,
contamination, toxic soils and heavy industry. We thus fortify this
collection of research by revealing vulnerabilities and injustices in
other areas of the supply chain or lifecycle of low-carbon technolo-
gies, especially manufacturing (for solar energy in Germany),
material inputs (cobalt mining in the DRC), and e-waste flows
(electronic waste scrapyards in Ghana). This offers more of a
‘‘whole systems” or ‘‘multi-scalar” investigation of energy justice
(Sovacool et al., 2019).3. Research methods: Case selection and mixed-methods
research design
To better understand the justice implications of European
decarbonization pathways and low-carbon transitions, we first
selected national case studies. We identified four case studies
where decarbonization has clearly occurred across two supply ori-
ented (nuclear power, solar energy) and two demand/end-use ori-
ented (electric vehicles, smart meters) dimensions. Our research
design then centered on an initial phase of expert interviews, focus
groups, and internet forums in France, Germany, Great Britain and
Norway, followed by a second phase of deeper and targeted expert
interviews, community interviews, and site visits in the Rhône Val-
ley (Southern France), Bitterfeld-Wolfen (Eastern Germany),
Agbogbloshie (Ghana), and the Katanga region (DRC).3.1. Case selection
In terms of our case study selection, France is well known for
being a major nuclear power producer, generating about three-
quarters of its electricity from nuclear fission. Germany leads the
world in its total installed capacity of solar panels per household.
Great Britain’s smart meter rollout has so far surpassed 15 million
meter installations and is expected to reach 85% of homes or small
businesses by the end of 2024, totaling 53 million meters. Norway
is the world leader for the per capita deployment of battery electric
vehicles, or EVs, where the country has the highest market share of
electric vehicles anywhere in the world, surpassing 40% of new car
sales in 2017, rising to 56% in 2019.
The formal methodological literature refers to this type of
research design as a qualitative cross case comparison (Gerring,
2005), the idea being that comparative cases offer more generaliz-
able findings than from a single case. Furthermore, for each case,
we see heterogeneity in terms of different stages regarding when
transitions begun, with France providing the most historical case
with their civil nuclear program kicked-off after World War IIand accelerating under the Messmer Plan in the 1970s, Norway
introducing EV policies in the 1990s, Germany implementing its
feed-in-tariff for solar energy via the Energiewende in the 2000s,
and Britain entering the main phase for smart meters in the 2010s.
3.2. Phase One: Expert interviews, focus groups, and internet forums
Following case selection, we proceeded with a two-phase, or
sequential, mixed methods research process. The first phase
involved 64 expert interviews in the summer and fall of 2018 with
a mix of respondents from academia, civil society, industry, and
government, summarized in Table 1, in each of the four countries.
In each interview, we asked (among other questions): What do you
see as some of the most significant injustices or disadvantages to
the energy transition being examined? We complemented data
collection with focus groups and the monitoring of internet for-
ums, both open to the general public. We conducted five focus
groups in non-capital areas of each country, namely Lewes (Great
Britain), Colmar (France), Freiburg (Germany, two focus groups),
and Stavanger (Norway), asking the same semi-structured ques-
tions. We lastly posted research questions on online internet for-
ums, three per country, to solicit public input beyond the focus
groups. These internet forums had more than 2 million collective
members and resulted in 58 additional responses, meaning they
were open to a large block of possible respondents and helped
hedge against the possible bias in our expert interviews and lim-
ited location of focus groups.
3.3. Phase Two: Focused expert interviews, community interviews, and
site visits
This first phase of the research process generated a comprehen-
sive and dispiriting list of 120 perceived injustices, across these
four transitions, including 19 commonly recurring injustices. Ana-
lytically, such a long list of injustices fell across very different
dimensions of justice, including distributive justice (costs and ben-
efits), procedural justice (due process), cosmopolitan justice (glo-
bal externalities), and recognition justice (vulnerable groups)
(Sovacool et al., 2019). Nonetheless, this ‘‘list” of injustices did
not weight the injustices by importance, nor did it seek to examine
which particular communities may have been most impacted by a
given transition. Some of the qualitative data, however, did
strongly suggest particularly vulnerable groups (Sovacool et al.,
2019).
For instance, respondents in France noted how wine growers
and vineyards have been negatively affected by nuclear power
development, with direct negative impacts such as changes to
micro-climate and water quality, and indirect impacts such as rep-
utational damage over nuclear accidents and leaks.
Respondents in Germany discussed how solar employees them-
selves were acutely vulnerable to the boom and bust cycles in the
solar industry, with many losing their jobs and pensions, and entire
communities (mostly in Eastern Germany) collapsing.
Respondents in Norway discussed scarce material inputs such
as cobalt and terrible working conditions at places such as the
DRC, and that cars were only deemed sustainable in Norway
because they made the batteries for them somewhere else. The
DRC currently dominates the global production of cobalt, with
69% of worldwide raw material production in 2018 (Moores,
et al., 2019); the next largest producer is Cuba which accounts
for only 5% of global production (Geological Survey, 2019). Indus-
try analysts predict that DRC dominance will only grow in the
future, anticipating that the country’s share of cobalt production
will rise to 75% by 2021 (Moores, 2018). This cobalt is an essential
component of the standard batteries used for EVs which often con-
sist of nickel–cobalt-manganese or lithium-cobalt-oxide designs.
Table 1
Overview of semi-structured expert research interviews, focus groups, and internet forums in Phase One of the Innopaths research project.
Method Country Date Respondents Illustrative institutions
Research
interviews
France July 2018 16 (mix of academic, government,
private sector, civil society, and think
tank respondents)
CEA (Atomic Energy Commission of France), Electricité
de France, ESSEC Business School, Greenpeace,
International Energy Agency, Organization of Economic,
Cooperation and Development, WISE-PARIS
Germany July 2018 16 (mix of academic, government,
private sector, civil society, and think
tank respondents)
BMWi (Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and
Energy), Ecologic Institute, Fraunhofer Institute for Solar
Energy Systems ISE, German Solar Association (BSW-
Solar), the German Solar Energy Society (DGS), Zentrum
für Sonnenenergie- und Wasserstoff-Forschung Baden-
Württemberg (ZSW)
Great Britain August 2018 16 (mix of academic, government,
private sector, civil society, and think
tank respondents)
Department for Business Energy & Industrial Strategy,
Citizens Advice, Energy Saving Trust, Good Energy,
Oxford University, Smart Energy GB, University College
London
Norway June – September 2018 16 (mix of academic, government,
private sector, civil society, and think
tank respondents)
Energi Norge, Ministry of Transport and
Communications, NTNU (Norwegian University of
Science and Technology), Statnett, the Norwegian
Electric Vehicle Association (NEVA), TOI (The Institute of
Transport Economics)
Focus groups France August 2018 3 (mix of genders, ages, and incomes) –
Germany* August 2018 4 (mix of genders, ages, and incomes) –
Great Britain August 2018 2 (two older women) –
Norway August 2018 6 (mix of genders, ages, and incomes) –
Internet forums France September-October 2018 11 Que Choisir, Forum photovoltaique, Droit Finances
Germany September-October 2018 2 Photovoltaik forum.com, Solarstrom-forum.de, Building
Technology Forum – Solar Energy
Great Britain September-October 2018 39 Money Saving Expert, Navitron, OVO Energy
Norway September-October 2018 6 Elbilforum.no, Tesla motors club Norway, SpeakEV
Source: Authors *Across two focus groups.
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largest demand for cobalt in 2017 (Moores, 2018). Tsurukawa et al.
calculated that the average EV involves 104 min of artisanal
Congolese cobalt mining labor (Tsurukawa et al., November 2011).
In Great Britain, respondents discussed the massive waste flows
being generated by smart meters, in-home displays, and associated
materials such as batteries and cables, which often end up in
African countries such as Ghana. Ghana and Agbogbloshie were
chosen because of their high-volumes of e-waste, which is mostly
imported from Europe (Schluep & Cambridge, 2012). Nearly half of
all e-waste from the UK (approximately 17,700 tons) for instance
ends up at a single scrapyard near Accra in Ghana called Agbog-
bloshie (Siegle, 2017; Hickey, 2018). On the receiving end, this
amounts to roughly 250 shipping containers of e-waste from the
UK arriving at Agbogbloshie every month (Ghana, 2018). The
United Kingdom was also called out as the ‘‘worst offender in
Europe” for illegal exports of e-waste, which also often end up in
Ghana (Laville, 2019).
Therefore, our first phase of research was followed by phase
two, where we focused on southern France (wineries and vine-
yards in the Lower Rhône Valley), Eastern Germany (solar manu-
facturing sites in Bitterfeld), Ghana (e-waste scrapyards at
Agbogbloshie), and the DRC (artisanal and industrial cobalt mines
in the Katanga Copperbelt) (see Fig. 1).
The objective was not necessarily to select cases that maxi-
mize representativeness (as in large N studies, with or without
random selection) or present directly comparable features
(e.g. as in cross-country comparisons) but to maximize the infor-
mation content of cases, and to support exploration of various
facets of a phenomenon. As such, our cases bring together differ-
ent features of information-oriented case studies in the context
of our focus on vulnerabilities linked to energy transitions (for
which unexpected or inviable tensions are of importance),
including: ‘‘Critical cases” (Ghana and DRC as highlighting unquantifiable
and acute levels of vulnerability). These cases are also ‘‘paradig-
matic” namely as the extreme invisibility of a) concerned pop-
ulations and b) up- and downstream impacts of energy
transitions in the West;
 ‘‘Extreme or deviant cases” (France, Germany) as the vulnerabil-
ities exposed are counterintuitive, especially given that the con-
cerned communities initially benefitted from projects;
Together, the four cases also present ‘‘maximum variation” fea-
tures as they offer opportunities ‘‘to obtain information about the
significance of various circumstances for case process and out-
come” (Flyvbjerg, 2006).
With these four vulnerable groups in mind, we embarked on
our second phase of more focused research to collect data from
them. As Table 2 summarizes, this involved 48 additional expert
research interviews, 82 community interviews (with winegrowers
and wineries, solar workers and community mayors, e-waste
workers and their families, artisanal and industrial cobalt miners),
and 69 site visits (including vineyards and cellars, solar manufac-
turing sites and communities, e-waste scrapyards and recycling
centers, and cobalt and copper mines). To protect the identity of
our respondents, we refer to these only generically by type (e.g.
whether it was an expert respondent or a community respondent).
During each expert and community interview, respondents
were asked: ‘‘What benefits and costs associated with nuclear
power, solar energy, e-waste, or mining did you witness with the
community?” ‘‘Who has been the most vulnerable, or significantly
impacted?” ‘‘What community responses have taken place?”
‘‘What policies need implemented?” ‘‘What do you see the future
as being like for affected communities?” Each interview lasted gen-
erally between 45 and 120 min (for the expert interviews) or 10
and 45 min (for the community interviews). Each of the naturalis-
tic site visits lasted between 20 and 180 min.
a. French wine Appellations in the lower Rhône Valley (AOC Grignan-les-Adhémar) b.The Bitterfeld community in Eastern Germany
c.The Agbogbloshie scrapyard for electronic waste near Accra, Ghana d.The Central African Copperbelt and cobalt mines in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo
Source: Authors compilation. 
Fig. 1. Vulnerable case study communities in France, Germany, Ghana, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
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dor and protect them from potential retaliation. All interviews were
fully transcribed and coded, and each respondent was given a
unique respondent number. For all community interviews and site
visits, the authors travelled at all times with a team that included at
least one native speaker (who spoke French, German, English in
Ghana, or French and Congolese in the DRC). In Ghana and the
DRC, this included a team of local research assistants who also
spoke local languages such as Akan and Mole-Dagbani (in Ghana)
and French, Kikongo, Lingala, Swahili and Tshiluba (in the DRC).
These methods together resulted in the collection of a rich,
unique qualitative dataset that extensively documented the costs
and risks to decarbonization across the four communities exam-
ined. The next Sections 3–6 present our results, and we make con-
clusions for both policy (drawn from a subsample of our expert
interviews) and research in Sections 7 and 8.4. Polluted vineyards and lost revenues: French wineries in the
shadow of nuclear power
Our first case of nuclear power involves a state-backed
energy transition championed by longstanding notions to make
France ‘‘radiant” (Hecht, 1998) again but also to reinvigorate
technical expertise in engineering as well as legitimacy with
centralized state planning (Jasper, 1992). While there have been
many vulnerable groups exposed to the externalities of nuclear
power (such as negative learning and construction costs, water
pollution and nuclear waste) in France (Chateauraynaud &
Debaz, 2017; Brouard & Guinaudeau, 2015; Grubler, 2010;
Topçu, 2008), we focus on a particular under-acknowledged
group whose close proximity to nuclear power plants has been
significantly impacted: French wineries, winegrowers and
winemakers.
Table 2
Overview of semi-structured expert research interviews, community interviews, and site visits in Phase Two of the Innopaths research project.
Method Community Date Respondents Illustrative Institutions or Locations
Expert research
interviews
French wine January to February
2019
1–7 (mix of wine representatives,
wine trade experts, wine specialists,
anti-nuclear associations)
Commercial representatives of wineries, Syndicat
général des Côtes du Rhône, Université du Vin, Wine
trade experts, Wine journalists, Sortir du Nucléaire,
CRIIRAD
German solar February and March
2019
1–7 (mix of research institutes,
private solar firms, mayoral offices,
unions)
Fraunhofer ISF, municipalities, mayoral offices, private
solar firms
Ghanaian e-waste January and
February 2019
1–11 (mix of government, civil
society, private sector, and academic
respondents)
Environment Protection Agency (EPA), Ministry of
Environment, Science, Technology and Innovation
(MESTI), World Resources Forum, Greater Accra Scrap
Dealers Association (GASDA), Scrap Dealers Association





1–23 (mix of government, civil
society, private sector, and academic
respondents)
Service d’Assistance et d’Encadrement du Small Scale
Mining (SAESSCAM, recently renamed SAEMAPE, the
Ministry of Mines, Deutsche Gesellschaft für
Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), Gécamines (state-
owned mining company), ’entreprise minière Congo
Dongfang Mining (CDM mining), Tenke Fungurume
Mining (TFM), Glencore, and Ruashi Mining, Université
de Kinshasa, Université de Lubumbashi
Community research
interviews
French wine January to February
2019
1–6 (winegrowers and residents) Various local winegrowers, wineries, and bottlers in the
Rhone and Grignan-les Adhémar regions
German solar February and March
2019
1–7 (local community members, ex-
solar workers, local journalists)
Ex-solar workers in the Bitterfeld region, other local
affected community members
Ghanaian e-waste January and
February 2019
1–21 (e-waste scrapyard workers,
their families, labor leaders,
politicians, and those supporting e-
waste via marketing and vending)
E-waste workers and communities throughout





1–48 (mix of artisanal cobalt miners
as well as artisanal bosses or chiefs,
crushers, carriers, drivers, refiners,
safety inspectors, sorters, labor
unions and members of the mining
police)
Various artisanal mining teams, artisanal mining





French wine January to February
2019
7 vineyards (within and beyond focal
AOC), wine cellars, winemaking
training centers and archives, 3
nuclear sites, and 1Wine Trade fair in
Paris
Within AOCs Grignan-les Adhémar, Côtes du Rhône,
Marcoule, Tricastin, Cruas-Meysse
German solar February and March
2019
8 (solar manufacturing sites, affected
communities, administrative
decision-making centers)
Solar Valley, Bitterfeld-Wolfen, Halle, Magdeburg
Ghanaian e-waste January and
February 2019
20 (formal and informal scrapyards,
affiliated industries)
Agbogbloshie scrapyard, Old Fadama Market,
Agbogbloshie Health Clinic, Accra Compost & Recycling
Plant, Akooshi Recycling Centre, Dawa Steel Mill and





30 (artisanal and industrial mines,
legal and illegal mines, mines as well
as trading depots and processing
centers)
Ruashi artisanal cobalt mine, Kasulu artisanal mine,
Depot 169, Depot 2, Depot 18, Depot 1000, Depot
Thomas Boss Billy, Solola and Kabica artisanal mines,
Katanga and Fungerume artisanal mines, Kawama
artisanal mine
Source: Authors. AOC = Appellation d’Origine Contrôlée.
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(See Appendix I for more details on methods), respondents noted
that nuclear plants had impacted negatively on some agricultural
sectors, notably wine making, with one expert respondent noting
that winegrowers in particular were ‘‘very resistant to nuclear devel-
opment.” This point was also picked up by another expert respon-
dent who claimed that ‘‘wine growers . . . whose vineyards were in
the vicinity of plants were affected. In other areas . . . there is radioac-
tive material in the water supply.”
Given that nuclear power generation activities are sited near
water sources for cooling purposes, a significant number of
France’s 58 nuclear reactors are located in the vicinity of French
winegrowing areas. We thus focused on the cohabitation of wine
and nuclear industries in the lower Rhône valley – a significant
winegrowing region, and also one of France’s ‘‘most nuclearized”areas (Roudil, 2007). We focused in particular on the area around
the 3660 MW Tricastin nuclear power site which hosts four reac-
tors, fuel processing, enrichment and storage activities, and
employs an estimated 8000 people (Rhône-Alpes, 2012).
Across the river from the Tricastin nuclear facility, the Appella-
tion d’Origine Contrôlée (AOC) Côteaux du Tricastin (‘‘protected
designation of origin” certified by the Institut national de l’origine
et de la qualité, or INAO), obtained its certification in 1973. (Olivier,
1996) Since the mid-1980s a series of incidents at the nuclear site
have exposed the vulnerability of safety measures, worrying resi-
dents, and, most critically, affecting the image of local agricultural
produce including wine. For example, in April 1987, Areva’s Tricas-
tin fast breeder reactor leaked coolant, sodium, and uranium hex-
achloride, injuring seven workers and contaminating water
supplies (Sovacool, 2011). This incident was one of a string of fail-
B.K. Sovacool et al. /World Development 137 (2021) 105116 7ings in the late 1980s, taking place in the wake of the 1986 Cher-
nobyl disaster and contributing to ‘‘deteriorating the image of
the nuclear industry in France” (Roudil, 2007).
Further safety concerns followed, and since 1997 the govern-
ment has organized the distribution of iodine tablets to residents
living in the immediate vicinity of nuclear sites in case of major
incident (CSN, 2001). As one community respondent recalls:
Tablets were distributed to residents of certain municipalities,
while others were decided out of the perimeter, which was quite wor-
rying as if a tablet would be the thing to save us in case of a nuclear
disaster . . . There is an unusual number of people who developed
unexplained cancers.
In 1999, a number of safety failings took place on the Tricastin
site, including the irradiation of a worker in a ‘‘red zone.” This led
the Direction de la Sûreté des Installations Nucléaires (DSIN) to
heavily criticize Électricité de France for failing to meet routine
safety standards (LM, 1999). In another accident in July 2008,
radioactive wastewater was released into local rivers, leading to
the closure of the entire nuclear site, a ban on irrigation, and the
local population having to rely on bottled water (LM, 2008a,
2008b). The incident, even though it was classified as ‘‘minor”,
became a truly ‘‘runaway media event”, and its effects were not
contained even by a concerted Public Relations strategy (Suchet,
2015). An expert respondent recalls that if previous, less media-
tized, incidents had not significantly affected the wine industry,
the 2008 crisis led winemakers to ‘‘change position . . . they were
no longer willing to remain associated to nuclear”.
Indeed, these accidents at Tricastin almost instantly tarnished
the image, reputation and attractiveness of the local wine produc-
tion, which has struggled to recover especially since the 2008
events. Production dropped by 40% over the 2 following years, with
one expert respondent confirming that ‘‘many owners opt[ed] to
uproot their unproductive vineyards” (AFP, 2010). Reacting to the
incident, a representative for Inter-Rhône (the Interprofessional
association of Rhône wines) commented that it would be ‘‘point-
less” to try and sell a bottle of Côteaux du Tricastin, as they would
be ‘‘laughed at” (LE, 2008).
Community respondents told us that loyal customers and
restaurateurs (including reputable chefs) started fleeing the appel-
lation that had become perceived as toxic and unsellable, leading
the AOC to commission a survey to better understand consumer
sentiment. One respondent noted that ‘‘we made the mistake of
believing that this cohabitation with nuclear energy would be prof-
itable.” The incidents in the 2000s especially occurred at a particu-
larly difficult time for the AOC, having halved its production
between 2002 and 2007 (LE, 2008). They are akin to an environ-
mental form of dispossession, where perceived pollution flows
(visible and invisible, such as radioactivity) interlink with preexist-
ing economic or geographic factors to marginalize one community
(winemakers) over another (nuclear suppliers).
5. Sacrifice zones: The dispossession of German solar energy
workers
Our second case focuses on Germany, known for its
community-backed, more democratically planned push for low-
carbon yet distributed electricity sources, especially household
solar energy (Morris & Jungjohann, 2016). Since the 1990s, Ger-
many has sought to catalyze low-carbon industrial sectors, includ-
ing solar photovoltaics (PV) and wind, stimulating these through
the Energiewende’s feed-in tariff as well as the provision of invest-
ment grants for example in the eastern states of Germany
(Fraunhofer, 2018). However, during our first round of interviews
and focus groups in Germany, respondents cautioned that the solar
transition was only of temporary benefit to some of its workers. As
one expert respondent explained:The real vulnerable group from the solar transition is not often
talked about, namely 100,000 people who lost their jobs in the German
solar sector over the past years. You have trade unions and govern-
ment going, oh my goodness, we cannot shut down coal because of
all the work and these regions. Yet Solar World and other big produc-
ers have shut down in the past years and they didn’t make a peep
about those workers. Workers in the German renewable energy sector
are a vulnerable population.
The Eastern German region of Bitterfeld-Wolfen, Saxony – a for-
mer coal mining site and now a self-proclaimed green-industrial
city – was both central to solar PV manufacturing and particularly
effected by its boom and bust cycles (Brock et al., forthcoming).
Since 2008, the market share of German solar manufacturing has
dropped dramatically. Unable to compete with subsidized Chinese
production, an estimated 90% of German solar jobs have been lost
and almost every major solar manufacturer has filed for bank-
ruptcy (Lütkenhorst & Pegels, 2014). The International Renewable
Energy Agency estimates that solar jobs in Germany reached a high
of more than 100,000 employees in 2008 dropping to fewer than
36,000 by 2018 ([IRENA] International Renewable Energy Agency,
2018).
The fall of the solar sector had several key negative impacts for
Bitterfeld-Wolfen. Around 5000 direct jobs in solar manufacturing
were lost in the region. Although some of those in white collar
managerial jobs were more mobile and could move elsewhere,
lower skilled workers, who had been trained in the sector and were
not unionized, had to seek new jobs. These were often found
within the region’s chemical parks or the newly-opened car facto-
ries near Leipzig, for example, though many remained unem-
ployed. The impacts thus hit lower-skilled workers hardest,
causing political resignation, rising class inequalities and lack of
opportunities particularly for low-skilled workers. This illustrates,
once again, that ‘‘green” jobs are not automatically ‘‘good”, well-
paid, secure or well-protected against market dynamics.
Local communities and municipalities also lost out in several
ways. They forwent the high tax revenues they had been enjoying
for several years, with many of the local amenities such as recre-
ation centers, swimming pools, and schools that had been sus-
tained by solar wealth now lying dormant. Furthermore, some
municipalities which had entered into cost-sharing arrangements
with private solar companies on industrial parks for example were
left with debts to pay, and no private sector counterpart to share
the costs. As one community respondent said:
A disadvantage for the community was that they were stakeholders
in the businesses in solar valley and were co-owners of the water,
security, road, waste water, street lamps, road gritting infrastructure,
especially in Thalheim village. They not only lost revenues on lost prof-
its that they had been enjoying but also had to bear some costs of site
decommissioning, e.g. paying for security systems to be de-installed.
This created a double burden of not only lost jobs and income,
but additional costs for decommissioning.
The bust of the solar industry essentially transformed
Bitterfield-Wolfen, once again. This transformation must be read
in the context of the past experience of collapse after the end of
the coal industry and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, which
had economically and socially disastrous effects on the area –
including job losses, young people leaving the area, deprivation
and poverty. The psychological impacts, depression and political
resignation following the fall of the solar manufacturing thus
brought back bitterness and feelings of acting as a ‘‘sacrifice zone”,
according to one community participant, for ‘German’ industrial
development – first to provide coal-powered electricity to rebuild
Germany after the war, and now for the broader renewable energy
transition. ‘‘Berlin got the electricity, we got the ashes,” the intervie-
wee added. As another community respondent explained, ‘‘Every-
thing was moving very fast and then suddenly. . . the catching up
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twice”, as a local respondent explained, and the new pride about
having an international corporation – the biggest one in Eastern
Germany – was quickly crushed, followed by disillusion.
Both expert and community respondents showed mixed feel-
ings about what some saw as the ‘‘inevitability” of the effects of
free markets searching for the most profitable places for produc-
tion, while others pointed to the role of the German government
in letting the industry ‘‘fall”: the refusal to provide subsidies in
the face of subsidized Chinese competition or to impose tariffs onto
foreign panels out of concerns for the German automobile industry
(Brock, et al., forthcoming). As one expert explained: ‘‘The govern-
ment could have tried to give subsidies to the industry as it does with
other sectors, such as the automobile industry, but it didn’t want to”.
The German case was thus strongly shaped by shifts in government
policy – unemployment in the solar energy sector was seen as an
acceptable loss politically compared to efforts to protect the (his-
torically socially embedded and strongly unionized) coal sector –
coupled with intensified competition from Chinese firms, rather
than a saturated market. The end result was political resignation,
depression and cynicism that facilitated the rise of anti-migrant
populism and the far right (Lobenstein, 2017) in the area.6. Embodied externalities: The toxic effects of smart meters,
batteries, and e-waste in Ghana
Our third case involves a more complex geopolitical and neo-
colonial relationship between Ghana, a former British colony, and
burgeoning flows of hazardous e-waste emanating from Great Bri-
tain (and elsewhere in the Global North) (Amankwaa, 2017;
Amuzu, 2018). During the first round of our data collection in Great
Britain, respondents discussed the generation of e-waste flows and
recycling challenges that emerge from the smart meter rollout.
This relates not only to the old meters that smart meters are
replacing, but the smart meters themselves, which were estimated
to have a much shorter lifetime of 5–10 years compared to average
50–60 years of a typical old meter. Other respondents discussed
the waste flows with smart meter associated in-home displays
and batteries. As one expert respondent stated, ‘‘If you think of
the in-home display and environmental impact, it’s another digital
device in people’s homes, another thing that they don’t necessarily
need that will be eventually recycled, managed and wasted.” Smart
meters thus contribute to a growing wave of accumulated elec-
tronic devices that generate streams of e-waste.
The majority of e-waste that the UK exports, including those for
in-home displays, monitors, cables, computers, and batteries, ends
up at Agbogbloshie in Ghana. Agbogbloshie is a community neigh-
borhood and scrapyard, formerly a wetland, within the Greater
Accra Metropolitan Area. Even though it is relatively small-less
than a square mile in total size – it is the ‘‘main hub” in the country
for e-waste, home to at least 40,000 inhabitants living and working
around the scrapyard (Akortia, 2017). Agbogbloshie is also closely
located to local communities and the cohabitation of the scrapyard
alongside a yam market, tomato market, onion market, football
pitch, and mosque.
A convergence of factors makes the scrapyard an excessively
toxic environment. Batteries from EVs and other devices are sub-
ject to uncontrolled acid drainage, as well as hazardous methods
for breaking batteries with machetes (see Fig. 5). (Atiemo, 2016)
Highly toxic elements reside within e-waste streams, including
capacitors containing polychlorinated biphenyls, gas discharge
lamps, batteries, plastics containing brominated flame retardants;
liquid crystal displays, external electric cables and electrolyte
capacitors as well as asbestos, mercury, refractory ceramic fibers,
and radioactive substances ([Ghanaian] Environmental ProtectionAgency., 2018). Unlike organic waste, the hazardous materials
involved in e-waste are longer lived and more potent, with expo-
sure being chronic and constant (Itai, 2014). Multiple vectors exist
for e-waste toxins to spread, including air, water, food, smoke, and
dust (Akortia, 2017). Unlike most waste facilities in Europe or
North America, residents live in close proximity to the pollution
flows and open burning, which exposes not only male workers,
but also women and children in those areas (Srigboh, 2016). Insuf-
ficient personal protective equipment are available for workers,
and health and safety monitoring for workers and neighboring
communities is absent (Atiemo, 2016).
One expert respondent contextualized the dilemma of e-waste
processing in Ghana as follows, noting severe risks for e-waste
workers, women and children:
E-waste, growing daily via the use of computers, batteries and
other smart energy systems, has directly resulted in one of the big-
gest slums here in Ghana, the second biggest slum in Africa, one of
the five biggest in the world. More than 100,000 people live here in
abject poverty, home to the biggest dump for scrap metal and e-
waste in the world. Young boys and girls, children as young as
six, seven, and eight years old are engaged in this business. They
miss school or end up dropping out of school, they go to the slum
for a career, or they look for scrap to finance their own education.
Even though they go to look for scrap metal, they end up doing it
for the rest of their life. I know a story of a young boy, who was
not wearing any protective clothing, who got so damaged by the
hazardous material he died at the age of 12. Others see their life
shortened by decades. They cough, get infected, and fall sick. They
dedicate their youth to renting a wooden structure to sleep at
night, 5–6 children in a shack, close to the metal business so they
can work longer hours. They can make around $5 per day, some
very good ones $8 per day, trying to get copper, aluminum, and
wiring, to sell it to other agents. It becomes their life.
Another community respondent agreed that ‘‘e-waste activity
affects bystanders as well, female vendors selling water, cooks and
chefs, also farmers, traders, even shoppers at nearby markets.”
During the site visits, for example, children were playing foot-
ball amidst the toxic dust and fumes; young boys from Benin were
burning scrap; dozens of women and children were selling water
and food (in the open air), one five year old child was carrying a cir-
cuit board; and one Iman was even leading a group of chickens
across the scrapyard towards his mosque, pecking and eating toxic
material along the way.
Our interviewees suggested that many scrapyard workers and
households know of these risks, but simply accept them in the
absence of other opportunities. One expert remarked that ‘‘Agbog-
bloshie is a huge market for a population otherwise with no means of
survival in the urban environment. These people, they are not stupid,
they know the health risks, but they think: isn’t dying slowly better
than already dead?” Another expert respondent noted that ‘‘the
health risks are severe among e-waste workers themselves, who are
constantly exposed but have no personal protective equipment
(PPE). The work they do is highly hazardous, but the absence of PPE,
no gloves, no nose bands to protect them from smoke, living constantly
in toxic fumes, is like living in a giant cigarette all the time. Yet getting
sick is a death sentence. They will ignore symptoms and avoid
hospitals.”
A final dimension to vulnerability relates to refugees and
migrants who take up new jobs at the e-waste scrapyard. Migra-
tory workers and new entrants to the site are given the worst jobs,
and identified based on their religion or ethnicity. One community
respondent stated that ‘‘new e-waste workers are extremely exposed
. . . when they arrive, they are placed at the bottom of the scrapyard
hierarchy and are given the most toxic jobs, such as burning.” During
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ern Provinces of Ghana, or immigrants from Benin and Togo, who
were seen burning, never those from the Southern Provinces or
longer-time residents of Agbogbloshie. Another community
respondent suggested that ‘‘some new arrivals collect scrap with
babies on their back, sweating in the heat, other waste workers are
mere children, such as boys from Benin who can be as young as 6
and 7 [years old], burning for copper.”7. Child labor: Exploitation and violence in Congolese cobalt
mining for electric vehicles
Our final case involves mining in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, a regime with a history of armed conflict, internal displace-
ment, the militarization of natural resources and struggles over
governance that have lasted at least three decades (Haider &
Rohwerder, 2015). Mining in particular is associated with not only
weak oversight and governance, but an inverted hierarchy of inter-
ests that place corporate firms, mining associations and the
national government (and its security forces) above the actions
of communities and the miners themselves (Katz-Lavigne, 2019;
Vogel, 2018).
During our first round of data collection in Norway, multiple
respondents discussed issues of mineral inputs, metals, and extrac-
tive industries needed to manufacture EVs. Respondents discussed
how EVs are only ‘‘green” and ‘‘clean” in Norway because they are
made somewhere else. As one expert respondent noted, ‘‘There
are things with battery production that are of concern. Scarce materi-
als, terrible working conditions for people in mines in the Congo where
they have to get cobalt from.” As another explained, these mining
activities form the mineral backbone for low-carbon transitions
involving batteries, especially for EVs. They stated:
Mining and extractive industries represent the spine or backbone of
the industrial manufacturing sector that makes all of our low-carbon
innovations and products. Without metals and minerals, these prod-
ucts simply wouldn’t exist. The key to our low-carbon future is miner-
als, with very specific properties of materials with unique effects, so
how we manage minerals will determine how society can function.
The key will lie in better sustainable production and extraction. We
see this need most clearly in the cobalt mines of the Congo, which feed
currently into every available EV on the market.
Almost all of the DRC’s cobalt resources are concentrated in one
region, the ‘‘Copperbelt” or ‘‘geological scandal” of Katanga, which
sits in the Southeast near the Zambian border, and contains an esti-
mated 3.6 million tons of recoverable cobalt (World Bank, 2007).
There, cobalt is commonly mined as a byproduct of either copper
or nickel mining. This region of DRC has some of the highest quality
reserves globally, which makes it especially suitable for artisanal
and small-scale mining (ASM) efforts, where cobalt can be har-
vested with ‘‘low-tech” options including digging small tunnels
by shovel, pickaxe, or even hand. ASM cobalt and copper mining
in the DRC generally takes two forms. One is where miners, typi-
cally young men, work to dig underground tunnels with shovels,
chisels, and mallets as far as 30–40 m deep. Another is where,
some men and many children and women collect and dig for cobalt
in discarded tailings and slurry close to – or even on – industrial
large-scale mining sites and concessions. Both types of ASM have
accelerated during the recent ‘‘cobalt rush.”
Yet such mining activities, especially in the ASM sector, occur in
a precarious working environment with little to no regard for
safety or the protection of children. At ASM Congolese cobalt
mines, the World Bank (World Bank, 2007) has noted, poverty is
rampant, and the vast majority of miners are subsistence diggers
(or creuseurs) that barely make enough to survive. Many are refu-
gees fleeing regional ethnic conflicts and wars, or orphans. Childlabor is widely used, with many orphans and ex-child soldiers
seeking the livelihood opportunities offered by ASM cobalt mining,
also due to a lack of incentives for school or other jobs. Gender dis-
crimination is entrenched even though up to half the ASM work-
force are women, with gender norms affording women lower
status than men, leading to unfair practices (women get the worst
jobs, for lower pay), obstacles to land ownership, illiteracy, and
widespread sex work. Best practice techniques or equipment is
completely lacking, with low levels of mechanization, poor recov-
ery efficiency, poor ventilation and lighting, and crude mining
techniques. Occupational health and safety is nonexistent, with
frequent injuries, mine collapses and accidents, as well as chronic
exposure to mercury, dust, fumes, rock falls, landslides, and other
environmental risk factors. Environmental degradation is severe,
with little regard for local environmental protection or ecosystems,
with direct dumping of waste and tailings, effluents discharged
into rivers and alluvial areas, soil erosion, deforestation, and the
loss of biodiversity. When communities discover cobalt (or other
mineral) resources of high value, they are often dispossessed by
state or corporate actors from accessing them, i.e. refused licenses
or permissions to mine, and in extreme cases forcibly relocated
from those sites, as was the case with the eviction of ‘‘tens of thou-
sands of people” near a £75 billion discovery of cobalt near Kolwezi
(Baker, 2019).
These features culminate in a ‘‘toxic environment” for mining,
one that an expert respondent put this way:
ASM cobalt mining is not living, it’s dying. The moment you step
inside the mine, the clock starts ticking. You are exposed to dust which
can lead to silicosis, or be poisoned by mercury. You can drown, or
become trapped in a mine collapse. You can get crushed by rocks, or
even contract diseases by people shitting or urinating into the mine.
You can suffer diseases from sitting in water all day, such as cholera
or malaria, or get bitten by animals, as many miners will bring them
into the mine. This is especially the case when they remain under-
ground in deep shafts for 5 or even 7 days at a time – it’s an under-
ground circus at that point, full of animal and human excrement,
I’ve even heard of people contracting the plague in such conditions.
Here in the Congo, you have elevated risks for heavy metal poisoning
from nickel or cobalt, or radioactivity poisoning from uranium. Even if
such things cannot kill you, they can still dismember or injure or dis-
able you. I know of people who lose arms or legs in a collapse, they
have to painfully break their bones to pull free. Many then bleed to
death in the jungle. Injury is often a death sentence, because you’re
usually on your own, far away from any medical attention. Whether
quickly or slowly, make no mistake, ASM cobalt mining will kill you.
Another expert respondent agreed and noted the ‘‘integrated
nature of the threats” that arise from cobalt mining, which lead to
‘‘poor and polluted workers” as well as ‘‘severe negative impacts on
local communities, including heavy metals in food and water, and
extremely high levels of cobalt and copper in the blood and urine of
women and children.” These can threaten miners with a host of
direct effects related to the mining itself, as well as indirect effects
that impact miners, their families, and local communities near
mining sites, such as pollution or increased risk of birth defects
(Van Brusselen, 2020).
The costs to ASM cobalt mining were not hyperbole, and were
mentioned by the miners themselves the research team spoke
with. One community respondent, a digger who stated to be four-
teen, said that he ‘‘work[s] 10 to 14 h a day, when there is daylight, so
that I can send money to my sisters and my mother.” Another young
miner told the authors he was an orphan and that he ‘‘mines cobalt
with a shovel to support three younger siblings.” Another community
respondent said that ‘‘We just jump in the hole, no safety. Fear is
always there, so I am always scared inside the mine. We just have
to conquer our fear.” Yet another remarked that ‘‘most of us suffer
from coughing, muscle aches, our body hurts all over. We work with-
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None of these young cobalt miners had protective shoes, gloves,
trousers, respirators, or helmets, just a single lamp and some
muddy clothing.8. Policy implications and recommendations
These four cases imply that the global community needs a coor-
dinated policy mix to reduce vulnerability across the dimensions of
raw materials, planning and policy processes, adoption and use of
low-carbon technologies, and waste management (see Fig. 2). Here,
we tap into our collective 48 expert respondents and reflect on the
recommendations they gave to our question about improving pol-
icy outcomes and making the four transitions more equitable and
just. To give a bit more context as to how much this suggestion
recurred across our interview data, we have put frequency counts
to the side of each suggestion.
At the stage of raw materials, greater transparency and trace-
ability about supply chains and sources would better reveal lifecy-
cle externalities so that they could be accounted for. Adherence to
the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of
Minerals would better protect vulnerable groups, especially child
miners in sub-Saharan Africa. Enforcement of occupational and
community health guidelines would ensure many of the most toxic
and safety risks associated with mining could be mitigated.
At the stage of planning and policy, the inclusion of more
diverse groups of stakeholders would better recognize concerns
related to gender or other demographic elements to transitions,
including ethnic groups and indigenous populations. Adherence
to meaningful Free Prior Informed Consent would both substan-
tively increase the involvement of vulnerable groups and also
enhance a social license to operate and legitimacy for each transi-
tion. Stronger Social and Environmental Impact Assessments, or
Impact Benefit Agreements, would require by statute that local
communities more directly benefit.
At the point of adoption, diffusion, use, or energy consumption,
some experts suggested that the promotion of shared ownership
and new business models (such as mobility as a service, or peer-Fig. 2. A multi-scalar policy mix for reducing vulnerabilityto-peer trading) could expand the access of low-carbon innova-
tions to reach previously excluded groups, although the literature
suggests that such interventions can also be problematic and
involve trade-offs across different dimensions of justice (Sovacool
et al., 2019). Multiple respondents suggested that compensation
or retraining those whose livelihoods have been disrupted would
better meet calls for a just transition. Strengthening consumer pro-
tections, especially for privacy, data, and regressive effects, would
also increase public confidence and establish legitimacy.
Lastly, at the point of waste management, transparency and
traceability about supply chains and sources would (similarly to
raw materials) better reveal and account for externalities. Expan-
sion of Extended Producer Responsibility would minimize waste
flows and increase the recyclability of low-carbon innovations.
Expanded legal sanctions and higher and enforced fines would also
minimize illegal shipments of e-waste, and ensure waste flows are
better governed.9. Conclusion and implications
Four European low-carbon transitions – French nuclear power,
German solar energy, smart meters in Great Britain, and Norwe-
gian electric vehicles – have sobering and troubling connections
to economic dislocation, unemployment and poverty, toxic exter-
nalities associated with e-waste, and the exploitation of women
and children in cobalt mining, as Fig. 3 illustrates.
Borrowing from the literature and logic of dispossession and
sacrifice zones, they can result in or perpetuate environmental dis-
possession (radioactive pollution or toxic exposure that degrade
land or assets), political dispossession (unfair and exclusionary
modes of policymaking and planning), economic dispossession
(lost jobs, eroded revenues, bankrupt businesses), and even physi-
cal dispossession (coercion and the constant threats of violence or
force). Table 3 shows how environmental dispossession is present
across all four cases, to varying degrees, alongside economic dis-
possession. Political and physical dispossession are less common,
but still present in two of the cases. Examining the evidence by
case and not degree of dispossession, we can see all four aspectsto low-carbon transitions (n = 48 expert interviews).
a. Winegrowing in the vicinity of the Tricastin nuclear power plant across the 
Donzère-Mondragon canal from Bollène, France 
b. Abandoned solar manufacturing infrastructure and factories 
at Solar Valley, Bitterfeld, Germany
c. Burning, draining, and sorting electronic waste at Agbogbloshie, Ghana d. A young artisanal cobalt miner exiting in the Kawama mine 
near Lubumbashi, Democratic Republic of the Congo 
Source: Authors. Express permission given by all communities and respondents for the photographs. 
Fig. 3. Four vulnerable communities to European decarbonization.
Table 3




Political, e.g. unfair plans or
procedures, lack of input in decision
making
Economic, e.g. lost jobs,
revenues, or community assets
Physical, e.g. coercion, violence, or
discrimination




+ (disputed safety regulations,
secrecy surrounding accidents)
+ (lost revenues and reduced
property prices)




+ (contested policy interventions) + (unemployment,
bankruptcies, collapse of








+ (ethnic exclusion of some
workers, beatings and frequent
fights on the site)
Congolese cobalt mining for
electric vehicles
+ (dust, pollution,
and land use with
mining)
+ (unfair nationalization of mining





+ (dependence on child labor,
exploitation of refugees and
displaced persons)
Source: Authors.
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forms present in all of the other three cases, implying that different
forms of dispossession can aggregate or interrelate as they nest
together in a nexus.
As Table 3 also implies, in some situations, low-carbon transi-
tions affect non-vulnerable groups, and introduce new vulnerabili-
ties through patterns of co-dependence raising exposure to
reversals of fortune. For instance, French winegrowers historically
benefitted from nearby nuclear power plants, and only became vul-
nerable to them after nuclear incidents attracted significant public
visibility and spilled over into reputational and economic impacts.German solar factory workers received well-paying jobs and pen-
sions until boom and bust cycles rendered solarmanufacturing cen-
ters obsolete. In other situations, low-carbon transitions seem to
aggravate and intensify preexisting vulnerabilities related to class,
ethnicity, or age, with refugees and migrants in Ghana given the
‘‘worst” jobs at Agbogbloshie, and orphaned children exploited by
cobalt mining bosses. In Germany, the rapid fall of solar manufac-
turing enhanced the pre-existing deprivation, inequalities and psy-
chological damage following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the
collapse of the coal industry and, triggering not just unemployment
but political resignation and the rise of the far-right.
12 B.K. Sovacool et al. /World Development 137 (2021) 105116Thus, low-carbon transitions can create, reflect and entrench
injustices and inequalities. They can intensify preexisting divides
between North and South, rich and poor, frontier and interior,
but also introduce new ones related to innovation patterns, local
pollution sinks, and volatile employment and economic growth
trends for communities. Our cases challenge and muddle up the
very distinction – or juxtaposition – of ‘‘clean” and ‘‘dirty” energy
generation by pointing to the social and ecological costs, often out-
sourced and therewith ‘‘invisibilized” – for Northern consumers –
to countries of the Global South. Patterns of inequality and their
reproduction blur the exploitation of old vulnerabilities with the
perpetuation of new ones. While these issues are well known to
scholars of globalization, development, and geography, we call
for greater attention to the ways these structural patterns of injus-
tice and inequality intersect with emerging low-carbon transfor-
mations in the name of sustainability. It is important here, and in
other low-carbon transitions, to perpetually ask ‘‘sustainable for
whom?”
One core conclusion resulting from this work is that we must
resist the temptation to only examine low-carbon transitions
(and the particular innovations underpinning them) at the point
of use. We should also look beyond the demographic of beneficia-
ries and adopters in Europe. Instead, we must acknowledge the full
spectrum of winners and losers, across lifecycle stages (extractive
industries, manufacturing, end of life), spatial scales (extending
to countries beyond Europe), and types of vulnerability (economic,
environmental, and sociocultural). This would help fight the glar-
ing disconnection between the low-carbon innovations prioritized
in energy and climate policy discussions, and the serious impacts
these innovations can have on vulnerable groups.
Relatedly, European low-carbon transitions are not just about
Europe. They generate complex externalities across their entire
lifecycle or whole system that reach as far as the artisanal cobalt
mines of the DRC and the e-waste scrapyards of Ghana. Our study
therefore challenges the nation state-centered way most planners
craft national and international climate policy, focused on things
like Nationally Determined Contributions under the Paris Agree-
ment and national carbon footprints or emissions trajectories.
We show its multi-scalar, within and beyond countries and involv-
ing the disparate stages of raw materials, planning and policy,
adoption and use, and waste management, which challenges an
entire regime of nationally oriented policymaking.
Furthermore, low-carbon transitions are not just about climate
change mitigation. They become intertwined with preceding
power dynamics and inequalities that can worsen patterns of prej-
udice and marginalization. The unintended or invisible impacts of
low-carbon transitions can consequently tarnish the reputation
and sales of agricultural enterprises, such as vineyards, operating
in close proximity to nuclear infrastructure in France. Low-
carbon transitions can create sacrifice zones of intensified unem-
ployment and community disempowerment, such as the bankrupt
solar manufacturing facilities in Germany, where they infest a par-
ticular locality with tangible direct and indirect benefits that can
overshadow ensuing risks. Low-carbon transitions can externalize
the dirty and toxic e-waste streams associated with smart energy
systems from Great Britain to the scrapyards of Ghana. Low-
carbon transitions can entrench and benefit from the exploitation
of orphaned refugee children mining for cobalt needed to make
EV batteries more affordable.
These often-obscured and rarely discussed dimensions to low-
carbon transitions reveal that the lived experiences of decarboniza-
tion do not always match the lofty goals enshrined in the Paris
Accord, the noteworthy targets embodied in the Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals, or the politically progressive ambitions stated in
European climate pathways. The more we currently accelerate
some low-carbon transitions, the more uneven developmentoccurs and the more a degree of violence, misery and mayhem is
also accelerated. There is a moral injunction to addressing one
pressing environmental problem of climate change by aggravating
other social and ecological problems related to disempowerment,
inequality, poverty, and exploitation. But there is also the prag-
matic concern of making such transitions self-defeating, for by
harming those most vulnerable among us they will invariable lead
to resistance and crises of legitimacy. It is no longer possible to
hide from or disregard the induced vulnerabilities to which low-
carbon transitions can contribute or exacerbate. Therefore, energy
and climate planners need to harness more robust, and urgent,
modes of accountability and action to better recognize and address
them.
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